Fragile States, Gender Equality and Aid Effectiveness: A Review of Donor Perspectives

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Introduction

Officials, activists and scholars have been preoccupied by state fragility at least since the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s, yet it is the events of September 11, 2001 that catapulted these concerns to the top of international policy agendas. Since then state fragility has been the focus of policy development in the OECD and the World Bank. Several northern governments have also issued policy statements on the subject.

Conceptions of state fragility, weakness and failure converge around two ideas. First, fragility refers to certain states’ inability and/or unwillingness to provide essential public goods like protection from external threats, rule of law and basic social services to most of their citizens. Second, fragility is a matter of degree -- ranging from states that have ceased to exist in all but name and cannot provide protection or welfare to anyone, to certain states that can deliver most public goods to most of their citizens. Within these parameters terms and definitions vary considerably, even in the donor community. The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has been fostering coordinated donor policy development in this area. It tends to use the concept of “difficult partnerships” to refer to situations in which “governments and state structures lack capacity – and in some cases, the political leadership – to deliver public safety and security, good governance and poverty reduction to their citizens” and where, as a result, genuine development cooperation and real partnerships are difficult to construct.

Many donors are concerned about the impact of state fragility on vulnerable populations, especially poor people on the ground as well as women and girls within these populations. Gender inequality is certainly a central feature of state fragility. Men and women are affected differently by the widespread human rights violations, pervasive poverty and physical insecurity that often characterize fragile states. At the same time, men and women -- and prevailing gender relations -- can contribute to or undermine positive change in fragile states. Donors are focusing on addressing the decline of certain states’ will and capacity to deliver basic public goods, and are grappling with how they might best help build states’ and civil society’s capacities for reform. Given these concerns, given that gender would seem to be an important feature of state fragility/capacity, and given OECD governments’ commitments to gender equality -- one would think that gender would be a strong thread running through donor thinking in this domain. To what extent is this so? What opportunities exist to enhance the systematic integration of GE in donors’ thinking on state fragility? These are the main questions addressed in this paper.

The paper offers preliminary answers to these questions by scanning emerging policy on state fragility in six agencies/bodies: AusAID, DFID, the OECD DAC, selected UN agencies, USAID and the World Bank. Most of these agencies/bodies are leaders in the community of donors working on fragile states, and all have strong policies on gender equality. Yet this paper suggests that donors are only beginning to bring their considerable learning about gender equality into their emerging work on fragile states. Where donors do address gender equality, the tendency is to focus on minimalist priorities - like promoting gender equity in service delivery and providing basic
education to women and girls—rather than embedding gender equality in broader and more comprehensive human rights and good governance theory and practice.

**Why does gender matter in fragile states?**

A generation of learning about gender and development suggests that there are two basic ways in which gender considerations are important in fragile states. First, men and women are affected differently by state fragility. Second, gender roles and relations are crucial to understanding opportunities and obstacles to state building. Here are some examples of why gender matters in each area.

**Different impacts**

- Human rights violations in fragile states affect women and men differently. In some situations women and girls are vulnerable to rape and other forms of gender-based violence, as well as to forced displacement. In others men and boys are targeted by campaigns to recruit or eliminate potential combatants.
- Limited access to justice also affects men and women differently. For example weak legal protection against domestic violence, and weak protection for women’s property claims, profoundly affect women’s ability to exercise their rights.
- Extreme poverty is another prevailing feature of most fragile and failing states. Women are hard hit by poverty where they are excluded from full participation in the labour force or in credit markets, by law or by practice. Women and children can also have less access to already weak social services like health and primary education in fragile states. Women and girls take on greater work burdens when basic services are limited and when men are drafted into war.
- Authoritarian and discriminatory politics in some fragile states can also limit opportunities for women’s participation in policy-making and implementation.

**Agency**

- Just as men and women are affected differently by fragility, they can be obstacles to or agents of positive change in fragile states.
- For example some women and their organizations might be champions of democratic participation and accountability. Others may encourage large-scale violence, as was seen in the Balkans, Rwanda and Uganda during the 1990s.
- Men can also be champions of reform. Some men have been at the forefront of struggles for democracy, economic equity and even gender equality. Yet history suggests that, in some circumstances, some men and the organizations they lead are drivers behind aspects of state fragility such as discrimination, violence, misogyny and the maintenance of elite privileges.
- Women and men, girls and boys, have much to contribute to transforming the dynamics of state fragility. They can contribute to building alternatives at the community level, to challenging state fragility at the national level, and to linking with efforts in neighbouring states, since fragility often spills across borders.
- The specific roles of men and women, and their potential as change agents, should be examined and reinforced in a context-specific manner.
This is the first of three papers NSI has written for CIDA. NSI’s second paper provides a short assessment of CIDA’s draft strategic framework for more effective engagement in fragile states and offers suggestions for enhancing CIDA’s gender-sensitive programming in fragile states. The Institute’s third paper considers how the policies and programming tools developed by CIDA, the UN and the DAC can be used to help CIDA bring gender equality meaningfully into whole-of-government and multilateral approaches to state fragility. These three papers may be brought together in a publication for used to promote the integration of gender equality in donor policy and practice on state fragility.

**Australian Aid (AusAID)**

AusAID has started developing a policy framework for engaging in fragile states. Its 2005 Statement to Parliament titled Australian Aid: An Integrated Approach, includes a section on fragile states. It defines fragile states as “countries that face particularly stark poverty and development challenges and are vulnerable to further decline – or even state failure.” The document suggests that:

- Fragile states which do not receive assistance are unlikely to improve and may contribute to insecurity and economic decline with regional spill-over effects.
- It is important to develop country-specific strategies that take into account local culture and politics.
- Yet general priorities for engaging in fragile states include:
  - Strengthening governance and combating corruption.
  - Fostering a “domestic constituency for change.”
  - Building sustainable institutions to promote growth and to deliver basic services, particularly in health and education.

The 2005 report is consistent with the priorities articulated in AusAID’s 2002 Investing in Growth, Stability and Prosperity document. That report suggests that in “poor performing” countries donors should foster incremental reforms to strengthen policies, institutions and systems of governance and should remain engaged over the long-term.

Neither the 2005 document nor the 2002 report systematically address gender considerations despite AusAID’s rich trajectory of work on gender mainstreaming. The 2002 document does call for consistent gender mainstreaming into development programs and strategies. Yet this is not reflected in the rest of the document, which fails to provide a meaningful explanation of how gender mainstreaming might be pursued in poor performing states. The 2005 document does not contain a single reference to gender.

Despite these omissions, these policy documents offer a number of opportunities for incorporating gender equality considerations in programming and policies in challenging contexts. For instance, both documents underscore the importance of conducting a sophisticated analysis of each development context that includes an examination of the power relations, and social and political tensions that are often at the root of weak governance and violent conflict. This type of analysis could provide a unique
opportunity to consider and address gender-based power imbalances throughout development policy and programming in fragile states.

Moreover, AusAID’s commitment to “broadening engagement” to strengthen civil society’s capacity to deliver services, and to promote good governance and respect for human rights may provide opportunities to support women, women’s organizations and other groups that are committed to equitable service delivery and broader reform, including along gender lines.

Department for International Development (DFID)

In early 2005 DFID published a policy paper on working in fragile states titled Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states.vii The paper suggests that:

- Well-targeted aid to fragile states can contribute to security, health, education and environmental quality.
- More effective aid delivery in fragile states requires improved early warning of and early response to pending instability combined with a better understanding of the political economy of and reasons for state failure.
- Aid alone is not sufficient for addressing the complex needs of fragile states.
- Donors need to pursue a more comprehensive approach that combines development, foreign and defence policy priorities and encourages better coordination.

The report also notes that effective aid delivery in fragile states will require strengthening state capacity. But DFID’s strategy sets out a less ambitious agenda for strengthening state capacities in challenging contexts. It calls for “good enough governance” reforms that prioritize developing a state’s capacity to deliver basic functions but avoid addressing “the most politically and socially controversial issues” that may undermine even basic reforms.viii

In February 2005 the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit released a major report on Investing in Prevention. Like DFID’s policy paper, the report calls for a sophisticated understanding of the complex causes of and dynamics behind instability, and outlines a number of recommendations for operationalizing international commitments to prevent conflict and coordinate responses to crises.

Both the Strategy Unit’s report and DFID’s strategy for engaging in fragile states are largely silent on gender considerations. The January 2005 paper makes only one explicit reference to the gender-specific implications of state fragility by underscoring the unique impact of physical insecurity on women and girls. While it acknowledges the importance of inclusive institutions and human rights guarantees, it does not consider how international and local providers can ensure gender equity in delivery of basic services or how donors might address gender-based violence and other human rights violations. DFID’s approach also lacks a gender-specific discussion of how strategies for engagement might address the unique constraints and obstacles to full labour force and
market participation facing women and girls. These oversights are surprising, given DFID’s impressive commitment to promoting gender equality in other areas.\textsuperscript{ix}

These lacunae are not entirely inconsistent with the rest of the document, which does not rigorously analyze the implications of various social divisions (i.e. class, race, ethnicity, and age) for policy and programming in fragile states. Yet the consequences of ignoring these social relations and identities, including gender, are far-reaching and may serve to undermine the effectiveness of strategies for engaging in fragile states. For instance, DFID notes that a focus on targeted reforms or “good enough governance” in fragile states may involve avoiding politically and socially contentious issues in order to deliver on minimalist reform. However, as the on-going transition in Afghanistan demonstrates, prevailing assumptions about the appropriate roles of men and women often reside at the core of political, social and personal identities. As such gender relations are often controversial. Yet a reformist agenda that does not contribute to the transformation of social disparities ultimately risks reinforcing prevailing gender inequalities and their attendant social, economic and political problems.

DFID’s policy approach does offer space for the incorporation of gender equality considerations. For example, the Department’s “drivers of change approach” provides opportunities for developing a better understanding of where power and privilege reside in society. It also facilitates strategies for addressing the systematic exclusion of women and other marginalized groups from political participation and decision-making. Furthermore, incorporating a gender perspective may provide the analytical tools required for considering the nature and direction of power relations in society as well as the political and social dynamics that incite, reinforce or counteract state failure.

OECD DAC

In February-April 2005 several OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) bodies reviewed draft Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States.\textsuperscript{x}

The draft Principles currently stipulates that donors should:

- Not disengage from fragile states. Instead they should engage for the long term “to build legitimate, effective and resilient state institutions.”
- Develop context-specific approaches in fragile states rooted in improved, ongoing and shared analysis.
- Adopt whole-of-government approaches and work towards policy coherence within and between governments.
- Seek to align with government-led strategies and certainly avoid activities that could undermine national institution-building.
- Employ a mix of aid instruments, including recurrent financing to basic services such as health and education where that is possible.
- Work to prevent the emergence of aid orphans and aid volatility in fragile states.

These principles grew out of four years of OECD DAC work on aid effectiveness in fragile states, coordinated with efforts by the World Bank and UN agencies. This work
has included a number of seminal reflections on the dynamics of state fragility and poor development performance, and the initiation in 2003 of a Learning and Advisory Process (LAP) to pool experiences in this complex area. Several other ideas were emphasized in earlier documents, and again more recently in the April 2005 Draft Principles. These included recommendations that donors should:

- Align more closely with local priorities/systems and maintain development activities in support of the poor.
- Move more decisively from reactive to preventive approaches.
- Support regional and sub-regional efforts to prevent, manage and reverse the negative impacts of state fragility.

Several DAC networks including the Network on Gender Equality have been involved in this process, and the LAP explicitly aims to incorporate lessons learned by other networks. Despite this effort, gender analysis has been conspicuous by its weakness in most DAC documents on fragile states. A November 2001 DAC note did not mention gender once, despite one observation on gender dimensions in the background paper for the December Senior Level Meeting. The documents setting out the mandate and work plan for the Learning and Advisory Process do not include gender as an analytical category. The Chair’s summary of the January 2005 Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States does not mention gender at all. The draft Principles document is also silent on the gender aspects of working in fragile states.

These gaps are surprising given DAC commitments to mainstreaming gender equality in development cooperation. Yet there are opportunities to bring gender back in. In 2005 the draft Principles could be enriched by incorporating practical references to conducting gender analysis and including women’s organizations in strategies for programming in fragile states. For instance, the Principles could stress the need to identify change agents in the state and civil society – especially among women and the poor – whose efforts to counteract state fragility can be supported. Future LAP studies could disaggregate the differential impacts of state fragility and “aid orphanship” on men and women. The LAP could be an incubator for learning about ways of supporting women reformers in the state, the private sector and civil society, and supporting the provision of social services aimed at the different needs of poor women and men. Greater involvement of the Gender Network in the LAP might help tap that network’s rich experience and inform work-in-progress on both sides of the gender/fragile states divide.

The United Nations

Alone among the bilateral and multilateral donors selected for this scan, UN agencies tend not to use the concept of state fragility as a framework for their policies and programming in such settings. Instead they typically frame their thinking in terms of peacebuilding, conflict prevention or transitions.

UN agencies tabled two key documents as examples of their work at the January 2005 Senior-Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States. The February 2004
Report of the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transitional Issues summarizes the state of UN knowledge and practice on “transitions” – which it defines as “the period in a crisis when external assistance is most crucial in supporting or underpinning still fragile cease-fires or peace processes by helping to create the conditions for political stability, security, justice and social equity.” On that basis it sets out a framework for integrating UN efforts around a properly-funded, coherent strategy encompassing humanitarian, security and development assistance, guided by shared contextual analysis and rooted in national ownership – including capacity-building for that purpose. The January 2005 UNDG Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices builds on that framework and presents tools that can be used by donors and national stakeholders to plan, coordinate and monitor cooperation processes in transitional situations. As such it offers a set of categories, questions and examples to help international and national actors place key activities in a calendar, identify realistic priorities, manage expectations, foresee and prevent bottlenecks, negotiate resource allocation and assess results along the way.

The UNDG/ECHA Working Group Report pays some attention to gender. It notes that “Assisting women in post-conflict situations and supporting their participation in peace processes is essential to peace-building.” Its list of key activities includes references to the gender aspects of restoring essential services as well as demobilizing, disarming and reintegrating ex-combatants. Yet this thread is lost in the UNDG Operational Note. One could argue that gender is implied in the recommendations for rooting transitional planning in national ownership, promoting policy dialogue among stakeholders, and so on. Yet the absence of explicit references to gender aspects of transitional programming, and the strong emphasis on using transitional results matrices (TRM) to focus on priorities and “manage unrealistic expectations”, beg questions about whether measures to promote gender equality are seen as “unrealistic expectations” that can be postponed since they are not priorities for preventing the recurrence of armed conflict.

Obviously, the UN’s record on gender equality cannot be judged only on the basis of these documents. Other UN bodies have developed approaches to gender that are germane to fragile state situations. For example, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), UNIFEM has championed the integration of gender analysis into conflict programming, the use of gender-disaggregated data in UN early warning systems, programs to protect women and children in conflict situations, measures to promote women’s participation in peacemaking and peacebuilding, promoting gender equality in justice sector reform, etc. UNDP has contributed to the implementation of such measures. Some of these advances are reflected in the December 2004 report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, as well as in the UN Secretary-General’s March 2005 In Larger Freedom report. Yet there is an enduring challenge of linking the emerging UNDG/ECHA work on transitional situations to wider UN work at the interface of gender, peacebuilding and conflict prevention.

**USAID**

In January 2005 USAID released its Failed States Strategy. The statement sets out four elements of a “strategic approach” to working in failed states:
• Enhancing monitoring and analysis of state failure in particular contexts.
• Setting clear priorities that correspond to realities on the ground.
• Focusing AID programs on the sources of instability.
• Streamlining operational procedures to enable rapid and effective responses.

The Strategy also outlines steps being taken to enhance the coordination of analysis, planning and implementation with other US government agencies. It builds on the Bush Administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy, and presents the AID paper as “a central component of our national security strategy.” It also builds on AID’s January 2004 white paper, which posited the need to strengthen coordination with other donors to enhance aid effectiveness and advance the attainment of the MDGs.

The AID Strategy makes several references to the gender dimensions of state fragility. In the section on enhancing analysis, it notes that “differentiating the impact of fragility on women and men is central to our understanding, as data show a strong correlation between state fragility and inequitable treatment of women.” This pivotal insight is repeated in the section dealing with the need to focus on priorities and on the sources of fragility. Yet these are the only two explicit references to gender in the document.

Nonetheless, the paper provides other openings for gender-sensitive programming. The gender dimensions of all the programming entry points identified in the document could be developed. For example improving security could involve engaging women to ensure that police reform programs include gender-sensitive recruitment by, as well as training and monitoring of, police agencies. Developing the capacity of institutions to provide social services like health care could entail engaging women to ensure that gender inequalities in access to public goods are also addressed. Supporting reformers outside the government could include strengthening organizations working to reduce conflict-aggravating gender discrimination or aggressive conceptions of masculinity. Promoting better governance of natural resources could involve supporting efforts to promote more access by women to those resources, for example through joint land titling programs.

In an annex the paper summarizes AID’s relevant experience in fragile states such as Afghanistan and El Salvador. It demonstrates deep AID and broader US experience in humanitarian assistance, postwar reconstruction and conflict mitigation. Yet it does not refer to the gender dimensions of AID programming in these situations. This is surprising, since the Agency has developed gender-sensitive policies and programming tools in some of these domains. The AID Office for Conflict Management and Mitigation, and the Women and Development Office, are designing new tools that could address these gaps.

**The World Bank LICUS Initiative**

In 2002 the Task Force on the Work of the World Bank Groups in Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) tabled a seminal report to guide the Bank’s work. It assumed that traditional aid programs are ineffective in LICUS because governments lack
the will and/or capacity to use finance effectively for poverty reduction. It suggested that donors need to pursue different development strategies in LICUS and must engage consistently and “for the long haul.” The Task Force provided analysis and recommendations to reduce poverty and contribute to the attainment of the MDGs in LICUS. It called for modest reforms that facilitate improvements in policies, institutions and governance over the long-term while focusing on immediate capacity-building for change, outcome monitoring, and basic service delivery. The Report made clear that these initiatives need to be rooted in solid sociopolitical analysis.

The LICUS Task Force Report did not incorporate gender dimensions into their analyses or recommendations. The 2002 report did not make a single reference to gender equality. This is difficult to understand in light of the Bank’s explicit commitment to gender equality in other domains.

However, there are opportunities for integrating gender equality considerations in the Bank’s LICUS strategies. The Task Force noted that in countries at high risk of conflict or in post-conflict contexts donors need to focus on preventing the intensification or re-emergence of conflict. In post-conflict societies this may mean prioritizing social over macro-economic reforms in the immediate term. This approach may provide openings for reforming discriminatory institutions and practices that perpetuate gender inequalities. However (like DFID) the Task Force argues that donors should avoid controversial or divisive reforms -- in practice this may mean that donors fail to address gender inequalities precisely because of their controversial nature.

The Task Force further argued that governments in LICUS may need to use NGOs to provide basic services like healthcare and education. While gender considerations are not addressed in this context, this approach does present opportunities for ensuring gender equity in service delivery. The Task Force Report noted that, given the prevalence of corruption in LICUS, donors need to be especially committed to putting in place appropriate mechanisms for monitoring outcomes of reforms, including non-governmental service delivery. This approach could help advance a gender equality agenda if gender equity in service delivery is a prioritized outcome throughout implementation and performance monitoring processes.

Finally, the Report stressed the importance of anchoring the design and promotion of development strategies for LICUS in solid sociopolitical analysis and identifying key stakeholders who can inform and champion a reform agenda. This would create opportunities for the inclusion of women’s groups, which may contribute to advancing gender equality agendas. In addition, the philosophical assumptions, lexicon and core questions guiding gender analyses may also provide useful tools for the “societal mapping” central to effective donor engagement, and for understanding the power relations, and sociopolitical dynamics that may complicate or facilitate reform.

Conclusions: Bringing gender into donor thinking on fragile states
A number of donors have developed or are beginning to formulate policies for development effectiveness in contexts of state fragility. Despite important divergences, the donors reviewed in this paper converge around an emphasis on remaining engaged for the long term, deepening their analysis of national conditions, building the capacity of state organizations to the extent possible, coordinating among donors and striving for policy coherence.

Emerging donor strategies also converge on another key point: none systematically incorporates GE considerations -- even though each donor has developed impressive policy and programming tools to promote gender equality in other domains. Where gender is addressed, the focus is on narrow priorities of gender equity in service delivery and education rather than linking gender equality considerations to broader human rights and good governance reform and capacity-building agendas.

This is not a minor oversight. The failure on the part of donors to address gender inequalities in policy and programming in challenging environments may undermine the effectiveness of strategies to address fragility. Effectiveness can be undermined by inattention to the different ways in which fragility affects men and women. It can also be undermined by missed opportunities for engaging women (and men) as agents of change.

This paper flags several opportunities to bring a generation of experience on gender and development into emerging policies on development in fragile states. Donors could:

- Involve key stakeholders – including women and women’s organizations – more meaningfully in policy and program development in fragile states.
- Review their analytical frameworks in related fields such as peacebuilding and human rights to enhance their ability to understand the gender dimensions of state failure, in general and in specific contexts.
- Review their gender equality programming tools in other domains to see how these could be used in fragile states. For example, other gender equality tools could be reviewed to see how they could help design programming strategies that target women and other agents of change, how they could promote participation by the poor and other historically-marginalized sectors, and how they could help curb the activities of agents of state failure. USAID’s forthcoming toolkit on gender and state fragility may offer insights in this regard.
- Draw explicitly on the GE theory and practice they have developed in other domains of activity, while ensuring GE policy and programming in fragile states is linked to broader human rights and good governance priorities.
- The OECD DAC could offer a platform for sharing work in progress on gender-sensitive fragile states policy/practice. In 2005, this could begin with a concerted effort to weave gender meaningfully into the draft Principles. Future Learning and Advisory Process (LAP) pilot efforts and studies could also make greater effort to address gender dimensions of state failure, ODA volatility, etc.
- Several donors’ frameworks, particularly DFID’s concept of “good enough governance” and UNDG/ECHA concepts of “realistic priorities” implicitly beg profound questions about where/how gender equality objectives come out in
negotiations over development priorities in fragile states. Obviously donors and national stakeholders must focus on essential priorities in order to prevent the slide from fragility into collapse, or to rebuild societies torn asunder by violence. Yet who decides, for example, that macro-economic or fiscal economic stabilization are more pressing priorities than restoring basic health services? Who decides that rebuilding a national army is more pressing than reforming laws and practices that systematically discriminate against women? One contribution of gender analysis is that it could help us unpack (inherently political) assumptions in this regard and give them the careful attention that they deserve.

Endnotes

i For seminal analyses of state failure see Zartman, 1995; Gross, 1996 and Rotberg, 2002.
iii The 1998 OECD DAC Guidelines on Gender Equality state that:
Gender equality requires equal enjoyment by women and men of socially-valued goods, opportunities, resources and rewards… Because of current disparities, equal treatment of women and men is insufficient as a strategy for gender equality. Equal treatment in the context of inequalities is insufficient as a strategy for gender equality. Achieving gender equality will require changes in institutional practices and social relations through which disparities are reinforced and sustained. It also requires a strong voice for women in shaping their societies.
iv This sample was selected in discussions with CIDA to include most of the donors leading policy development on fragile states, and a mix of bilateral and multilateral agencies/bodies. Originally we envisaged looking at a continental European donor, but our scan of policy statements by Netherlands and Swedish official development agencies suggested that they are not leaders in this area. In the end we selected AusAID since it is active in fragile states and stretches our scan beyond the North-Atlantic area.
v AusAID. January 2005: 11.
vn DFID, January 2005. DFID’s working definition of fragile states is not limited to states in conflict or emerging from conflict but also includes those states that lack the political will and/or capacity to “deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor.” Ditto: 7.
ix See for example, DFID, 2000; DFID, 2002.
x DCD/DAC, February 2005.
xi DCD/DAC, November 2001. In its otherwise comprehensive discussion of potential agents of change in fragile states, the background paper notes that “development agencies should not overlook other medium-term change agents that may work over a generation. The most powerful of these intergenerational changes is education and especially the literacy of women.” Ibid.: 11. The April 2002 DCD note on development cooperation in difficult partnerships is even less gender sensitive.
xii DAC/DCD, 30 September 2003 a and b.
xiii DAC/DCD, 1 February 2005.
xv UNDG, January 2005.
xvi UNDG/ECHA, 2004: 16.
xvii Ibid.: 21.
xviii See Michael Lund, 2003, for an eloquent expression of the view that redressing gender inequalities may not be a conflict prevention priority per se.
xix For more information on these policies and programming tools see www.unifem.org and the Women, War and Peace portal at www.WomenWarPeace.org.
President of the USA, 2002. The National Security Strategy identified failed states as a major threat to the security of the United States. It outlined a comprehensive strategy linking “nation-building” to “regime change” and pre-emptive defense as part of the “war on terror”.


World Bank, 2002. While the Bank has not formulated a definitive list of LICUS, these countries tend to be characterized by a debilitating combination of weak policies, institutions and governance as well as a limited capacity for reform. LICUS are also often - but not always - at risk of conflict or are recently emerging from conflict.


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UN Development Group and World Bank. “An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices. Using Results-Based Frameworks in Fragile States.” (January 2005)


